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Gardner: Constitutional Law: Indigency on the Ballot

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INDIGENCY ON THE BALLOT"

Lubin v. Panish, 94 S. Ct. 1315 (1974)
Petitioner, an indigent, was denied nomination papers to file as a candidate for the position of Los Angeles County Supervisor' because, although
otherwise qualified, he was unable to pay the filing fee required of all candidates.2 He then brought a class action for a writ of mandate 3 claiming that
the statute effectively barred him from participating in the electoral process
on the basis of wealth and alleging, inter alia, that he was thereby deprived
of equal protection as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The trial
court denied the writ of mandate; the court of appeal and the California supreme court affirmed.4 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,"
reversed, and HELD, a state requirement that an indigent candidate pay filing
fees as a prerequisite to ballot access without an alternative method of access
is an unconstitutional violation of fourteenth amendment equal protection.6
Since the Progressive movement in the early twentieth century, many
states have established various forms of filing fees to discourage lengthy
"laundry list" ballots.- Restricting ballot access has been alternatively justified as necessary to minimize voter confusion," to limit the number of runoff
elections, 9 to curb ballot flooding, 10 to prevent the mechanical overwhelming
of voting machines, 1 to relieve state treasuries of election costs, 12 to insure
that only serious, good faith candidates seek election, 3 to provide financial
*EDITOR'S NOTE: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the spring 1974 quarter.
1. The Board of Supervisors is the governing body for Los Angeles County, California.
Board members serve a four-year term at an annual salary of $35,080.
2. The California Election Code requires prepayment of a nonrefundable filing fee as
a condition to the issuance of nomination papers for all congressional, state, and county
offices. CAL. ELEC. CODE §6551 (West 1961).
3. The suit was first initiated in California superior court against the secretary of state
and the county registrar-recorder.
4. See 94 S. Ct. 1315, 1318 (1974).
5. 411 U.S. 964 (1973).
6. 94 S. Ct. 1315 (1974). Douglas, J., and Blackmun, J., with whom Rehnquist, J., joined,
concurred. Id. at 1321, 1323.
7. Id. at 1318. For a detailed analysis of all state filing fees, see Comment, The Constitutionality of Qualifying Fees for Political Candidates, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 138-42
(1971).
8. Fowler v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 592, 595 (M.D. Fla.), rev'd pending full hearing before
the Supreme Court, 400 U.S. 1205 (Black, Circuit Justice), appeal dismissed for juris.. 400
U.S. 986 (1971).
9. Fair v. Taylor, 359 F. Supp. 304, 305 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
10. Jennes v. Miller, 346 F. Supp. 1060, 1061 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
11. Bodner v. Gray, 129 So. 2d 419, 421 (Fla. 1961).
12. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 147 (1972).
13. Wetherington v. Adams, 309 F. Supp. 318, 321 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
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support for political parties,:" and to insure that nominees are the choice of
a majority of party members. 15 The United States Supreme Court has
recognized these goals as legitimate state interests.' 6 The Court has also
recognized, however, that these interests must be accomplished in a manner
that does not gratuitously burden the availability of political opportunity.
Moreover, it has frequently defined "candidate rights" in terms of "voter
rights."",
Traditionally, in determining the validity of equal protection claims, the
Supreme Court has required that state action have a "reasonable basis" in a
legitimate state goal.19 State classifications may not be arbitrary, 20 nor may
they invidiously discriminate. 2 . In recent years, however, the Court has developed a more exacting test requiring that when a fundamental right such
as voting2 2 is asserted, or when the classification is based on suspect criteria
24
such as race,23 state action must be "carefully and meticulously" scrutinized
to ascertain whether a compelling state interest based on a legitimate state goal
is demonstrated..2 5 When no compelling interest is shown in such situations,
20
the state action will fall.
27
In Bullock v. Carter the Court considered a mandatory Texas filing fee
with a ceiling of 8,900 dollars.2 8 Relying on previous decisions holding voting
to be a fundamental right, 25 Chief Justice Burger 35 made a logical analogy
14. Id.
15. Spillers v. Slaughter,-325 F. Supp. 550, 553 (M.D. Fla. 1970), motion for leave to
file petition for writ of mandamus denied, 402 U.S. 971 (1971).
16. 94 S.Ct. at 1319-21; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 147 (1972).
17. 94 S.-Ct. at 1320. "This legitimate state interest, however, must be achieved by a
means that does not unfairly or unnecessarily burden either a minority party's or an individual candidate's equally important interest in the continued availability of political
opportunity." Id.
18. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972). "However, the rights of voters
and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect
candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters." Id.
19. See, e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465 (1957); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911); Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897).
.
20. See, e.g., Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 566-67 (1931).
21. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
22. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). See also Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-101 (1972) (free speech); Shapiro Y. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634,
638 (1969) (interstate travel); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (marriage and procreation).
23. E.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 "(1964). See also Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (sex classified as suspect by four Justices); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage).
24. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
25. See, e.g.,. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
26. Comment, supra note 8, at 114. See generally Note, Developments in the Law Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REy. 1065 (1969).
27. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
28. Id. at 138 n.11.
29. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
30. Justice Burger wrote for a unanimous Court. Justices Powell and Rehnquist took
no part in the consideration or, decision of the case.
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between the right to vote and the right to seek political opportunity unencumbered by a "patently exclusionary" qualifying scheme based on wealth.
In finding both to be fundamental rights that "do not lend themselves to
neat separation," he reasoned that by burdening ballot access, the state was
limiting the field from which an electorate might choose and was thereby
indirectly affecting the right to vote.3 1 Upon "close scrutiny," the Court found
the wealth oriented, nonalternative provisions of the Texas law unsuitable
means to achieve legitimate state interests and held the statute unconstitutional 32 Chief Justice Burger emphasized, however, that it was the quantitative rather than the qualitative issues that were determinative in Bullock, and
cautioned "that nothing herein is intended to cast doubt on the validity of
33
reasonable candidate filing fees or licensing fees in other contexts."
In the present case, Chief Justice Burger, once again speaking for the
majority, found the California candidate filing fees to be within a moderate
range,3 4 and was therefore unwilling to distinguish Bullock on that ground.
Rather, the majority stressed the mandatory nature of California's fee
scheme. 35 Balancing the acknowledged interests of the state 30 against the
fourteenth amendment rights of indigent candidates and, a fortiori, voters
in general,37 the Court determined that filing fees, in and of themselves, bear
38
77o relationshipto the validity of a candidacy and the extent of voter support.
The Court, therefore, did not even refer to the "fundamental right-compelling state interest" standard of judicial scrutiny, 39 but merely held that
ballot access dependent upon a nonalternative, fixed fee was not reasonably
40
necessary for achievement of a state's valid election interests.
31. 405 U.S. at 142-49.
32. Id., affirning Carter v. Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358 (M.D. Tex. 1970).
33. 405 U.S. at 149.
34. 94 S.Ct. at 1320.
35. Id. at 1320-21.
36. Id. at 1320; see text accompanying notes 9-16 supra.
37. For the logical link between the right to seek political opportunity and the right
to vote, see text accompanying note 31 supra.
38. 94 S.Ct. at 1320.
39. See text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
40. 94 S. Ct. at 1321. "Selection of candidates solely on the basis of ability to pay a fixed
fee without providing any alternative means is not reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of the State's legitimate election interests." Id.
Justice Douglas concurred with the result reached by the majority but believed that
greater emphasis should have been placed on the wealth discrimination cases. Turner v.
Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) (state may not constitutionally require ownership of land as a
qualification for membership of the board of education); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969) (deterring indigents from migrating into the state not a constitutionally permissible state objective); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (filing fee denying
the poor access to the courts for divorce denies due process). In the criminal area see, e.g.,
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel in appellate proceedings). Relying
on Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), for the proposition that wealth
classifications are "traditionally disfavored" and for the concept that voting is a fundamental
right, Justice Douglas would have invoked the "fundamental right - compelling state
interest" equal protection standard of judicial scrutiny and held the California statute
clearly unconstitutional with regard to indigents, 94 S. Ct. at 1321-23.
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Concerned that legitimate state interests might be neglected, the Court
noted that a petition requirement based on a percentage of registered electors
would serve precisely the same function as a filing fee.41 In a poignant dictum,
however, the Court made dear that it would be extremely hesitant to accept
42
a write-in procedure as a constitutional alternative.
The present case is a logical extension of Bullock. Having in that case resolved the issue of exorbitant filing fees with respect to indigent candidates,
the instant Court could scarcely have made a distinction in degree. The situation of indigency, in terms of the principal case, is categorical; it could hardly
be said that an impecunious candidate should be excused from paying an
8,900 dollar filing fee, but not be excused from a 700 dollar filing fee.
The present case would appear to have an acute impact on Florida law.
Florida defines "candidate" in terms of filing fees. 43 All party candidates for
nomination to any federal, state, or county office are required to pay a nonrefundable, mandatory44 five per cent filing fee based on the office's annual
salary." Of this amount three per cent goes to the state and two per cent goes
to the affiliated party's executive committee. 46 Under certain conditions the
secretary of state is authorized to remit up to 85 per cent of the entire filing
47
fee to the county executive committee.
Candidates desiring to run as "independents" in the general election for
governor, lieutenant governor, or other major state office 4 are required by
Florida law to secure a petition signed by five per cent of the registered
Florida electors, submit the petition to the various supervisors of election in
the counties from which the names were solicited, and pay a ten cent per
name fee.49 Upon meeting these qualifications, independent candidates must

41. 94 S. Ct. at 1321.
42. Id. n.5. Accord, Socialist Workers Party v. Welch, 334 F. Supp. 179, 182-83 (S.D.
Tex. 1971); Wong v. Mihaly, 332 F. Supp. 165, 168 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Jennes v. Little, 306
F. Supp. 925, 929 (M.D. Ga. 1969) (three-judge court). Contra 94 S. Ct. at 1323 (Blackmun,
J., joined by Rehnquist, J., concurring, was adamant in his conviction that a nonfee write-in
was a constitutionally valid alternative for indigent ballot access); Swanson v. Kramer, 82
Wash. 2d 511, 519, 512 P.2d 721, 725 (1973).
43. " 'Candidate' shall mean any person who has filed his qualification papers, and
paid his qualifying fees as required by law." FiA. STAT. §97.021(18) (1973).
44. [1961-1962] FLA. A1r'Y GEN. BIENNIAL R'EP., 367, 367-68.
45. FLA. STAT. §§99.092(l), .061, .021(1)(a)(7), 105.031(3) (1973). Compare CAL. ELEC. CODE
§§6552, 6554 (West Supp. 1974) (requiring a 2% filing fee for United States senator, state
offices, and some county offices, a 1% filing fee for candidates for representative to Congress,
state senator or assemblyman, judicial offices, and district attorney, and no filing fee for
certain offices).
46. FLA. STAT. §§99.092, .061, 103.121(l)(g) (1973) (authorizing county executive committees to exact assessments up to 2%).
47. FLA. STAT. §99.103 (1973).
48. These offices include: secretary of state, attorney general, comptroller, treasurer,
commissioner of agriculture, commissioner of education, member of the public service
commission, justice of the Florida supreme court, or United States senator.
49. FLA. STAT. §99.152 (1973). Since there are approximately 3,015,931 registered electors
in Florida, FLORIDA STATiSTICArL AwsmAcr 1972, 516-18 (E. Jones ed, 1972), the petition would
require 150,797 names and an initial fee of $15,078.70,
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also pay the regular filing fee.50 Independent candidates running for nonmajor state offices must secure a petition signed by three per cent of the
registered electors in their district and pay a ten cent per name fee. If this
qualification is met, the regular filing fee is also assessed. 51 The same procedure is required for minority political party candidates except that only
one per cent of the district's registered electors are required to sign the
petition.52

Although the Florida Election Code provides for a write-in ballot as an
alternative candidate qualification procedure,5 3 the statutory language employed apparently requires a write-in candidate to pay a filing fee after meeting the initial qualifying procedures, to become a qualified "candidate." 54
After the Florida supreme court ruled in 1961 that reasonable filing fees
do not contravene the Florida constitution, ss indigent candidates began
challenging the state filing fee in federal district courts on equal protection
grounds. Early cases uniformly upheld the state statutes 6 stating that legitimate state interests- 7 justified the classifications involved. s Further, these
courts held that ballot access was actually a privilege extended by the state55
rather than a right, and therefore petitioners were in no position to challenge
the statutes. 60

50. FLA. SrAT. §99.152 (1973). Assuming the independent candidate would be required
to pay only the 3% state assessment, this part of the provision would require the payment
of $705 based on the salary for the office of public service commission, the lowest paid
of those offices enumerated, FLA. STAT. §282.01(6)(a) (1973), or a grand total, including both
sections of this statute, of $15,783.70. Compare the $8,900 filing fee termed "patently exclusionary" in Bullock v. Carter. 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
51. FLA. STAT. §99.153 (1973).
52. FLA. STAT. §103.201 (1973). Candidates for national committeeman and committeewoman are required to pay a $100 filing fee plus a party assessment not to exceed $25.
FLA. STAT. §99.101 (1973).

53.

FLA. STAT.

§99.023 (1973).

54. Id. "At the time of certif)ing under oath the above information, a write-in candidate
Ohall be considered a candidate as so defined in Section 97.021, except that he shall not be
entitled to have his name printed on the official ballot." Id. " 'Candidate' shall mean any
person who has filed his qualification papers and paid his qualifying fees as required by
law." FLA. STAT. §97.021(18) (1973). Contra, Wetherington v. Adams, 309 F. Supp. 318, 320
(M.D. Fla. 1970) (three-judge court).
55. Bodner v. Gray, 129 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1961) (holding that FLA. CONST. art. 5, §12
permits further requirements such as qualifying fees to be placed on seeking nomination for
Florida supreme court justice).
56. Spillers v. Slaughter, 325 F. Supp. 550 (M.D. Fla. 1971) (three-judge court); Fowler
v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 592 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (three-judge court); Wetherington v. Adams,
309 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (three-judge court).
57. See text accompanying notes 9-16 supra.
58. Spillers v. Slaughter, 325 F. Supp. 550 (M.D. Fla. 1971); Fowler v. Adams, 315 F.
Supp. 592 (M.D. Fla. 1970); Wetherington v. Adams, 309 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
Accord, State ex rel. Apodaca v. Fiorina, 83 N.M. 663, 495 P.2d 1379 (1972); Swanson v.
Kramer, 82 Wash. 2d 511, 512 P.2d 721 (1973).
59. See, e.g., Fowler v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 592, 595 (M.D. Fla. 1970).
60. Id.
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Following Bullock v. Carter,61 federal district courts in Florida began
reassessing their'position, and in two cases held specific provisions of the
Florida Election Code unconstitutional.62 In Jennes v. Miller63 the court
struck down the statutory requirement that indigent minor party candidates
pay ten cents per name for petition authorization.6 4 And in Fair v. Taylorthe court ruled that the five per cent fee requirement for party nomination
denied indigent plaintiffs' equal protection. of the law. 66 The Fair court was
unwilling to declare the filing fee requirements invalid per se, but rather
67
held that the state must provide an alternative means of ballot access.
Through declaratory and injunctive relief, the court provided an alternative
petitioning'scheme thaf did not require filing fees from indigent candidates.68
Clearly, the state has a very real interest in maintaining a "pure" ballot.
Among other evils, candidates for political office have been known to run
merely to'advance their reputations" and thereby enhance business opportunities.9 Similarly abhorrent is the process of "ticket splitting" whereby one
candidate seeks to divide his opponent's constituency by making collusive
agreements with individuals representing the latter's political philosophy,
ethnic group, or race. When the "stooge" enters the race, the opponent's constituency "splits" and leaves the malefactor the winner. 70 Filing fees have
traditionally served to mitigate such situations.
Unfortunately, mandatory filing fees have also served to exclude the poor
from political candidacy. The present case seems to have struck a balance between the two interests. While sustaining filing fees for those who can afford
them, the Court acknowledged that the length of one's pocketbook alone
cannot be made a yardstick of a candidate's good faith.
A petition requirement similar to that ordered by the court in Fair v.
Taylor71 would both preserve the integrity of the ballot and insure an alternative means for indigent political qualification. By compelling the impoverished candidate to secure a prescribed quantum of voter support as an alterna61. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
Fair v. Taylor, 359 F. Supp. 804 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (three-judge court); Jennes v.
346 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (three-judge court).
846 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
See FLA. STAT. §103.021 (1973).
359 F. Supp. 304 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
66. See FLA. STAT. §§99.061, .092, 105.031 (1973).
67. 359 F. Supp. 304, 306. Accord, Stoner v. Fortson, 359 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ga. 1972)
(three-judge court); Harper v. Vance, 342 F. Supp. 136 (N.D. Ala. 1972) (three-judge court);
Socialist Workers Party v. Welch, 334 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Duncantell v. City of
Houston, 333 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Wong v. Mihaly, 332 F. Supp. 165 (N.D. Cal.
1973); Thomas v. Mims, 817 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. Ala. 1970); Georgia Socialist Workers Party
v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Jennes v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431
(1971); Jennes v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Matthews v.-Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970); Zapata v. Davison, 24 Cal. 3d 823, 101 Cal. Rptr.
438 (Ct. App. 1972).
62.
Miller,
63.
64.
65.

68. 359 F. Supp. at 807-08.
69. 94 S. Ct. at 1820.
70. See State ex rel. Apodaca v. Fiorina, 83 N,M, 663, 666, 495 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1972).
71. 359 F. Supp. at 307-08.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss4/9

6

Gardner: Constitutional Law: Indigency on the Ballot
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVI

tive condition to ballot access, the state will surely have devised as good a
means of eliminating spurious candidacies as any system based solely on
wealth. Assuming that the requisite percentage of electors is sufficiently high,
those who do not entertain good faith aspirations for political office will be
unlikely to waste time canvassing signatures. Logically, a petition requirement is as sound a means of political qualification as any method based on
affluence. In fact, it can be forcefully argued that personal wealth should have
nothing to do with political qualification.7 2 Further, the Supreme Court has
recognized the constitutionality of such a measure,73 and has even encouraged
a step in that direction .'
The instant case should leave no doubt that Florida's requirement that
indigent candidates pay filing fees has constitutional shortcomings. The
write-in alternative, assuming, arguendo, that it turns out to be a nonfee
alternative75 is constitutionally invalid. 6 The Florida Legislature should not
rely on a plethora of federal court decisions to do its work. Rather, an
amendment allowing for a petition alternative should be passed, thereby
rectifying the Florida Election Code's candidate qualifying procedures in
light of the clear mandate of the instant Court.
MERRITT GARDNER

72. See generally Comment, The Constitutionality of Qualifying Fees for Political
Candidates, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 109 (1971).

73. 94 S. Ct. at 1321.
74. Id.
75. See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
76. 94 S. Ct. at 1321 n.5.
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